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ABSTRACT: In this paper we develop the first (static) microsimulation model aimed at studying the 
distributive impact of housing taxation on Italian households. We use as input data those provided by the 
Bank of Italy from its Survey on Households Income and Wealth, and discuss specific problems arising in 
the evaluation of cadastral income and of the Property Tax base. Our estimates of the distribution of 
taxpayers are very close to the Ministry of Finance official statistics; hence, our model can be seen as a 
reliable tool to evaluate the current distribution of housing taxation and the impact of potential tax 
reforms. Our simulations suggest that both Property Tax and Waste Management Tax show a moderate 
regressive impact with respect to household gross income, whilst the Personal Income Tax on dwellings 
other than the main residence is progressive. We then provide an application of our model, to study the 
Property Tax reform in 2008. Our findings show that all households owning the main residence gain from 
the 2008 reform, but tax cuts are mostly concentrated on the top three deciles of household equivalent 
gross income, so that the richest benefit most.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite the importance of housing in influencing 
citizens’ well-being, the large share that housing 
represents in citizens’ wealth, and the large share 
of income devoted to expenditures for its 
maintenance, housing taxation is an understudied 
topic that deserves more attention, both from a 
positive and a normative perspective. For 
instance, from a positive perspective, questions 
arise in order to explain the current distribution of 
housing taxes and how they impact on the 
distribution of resources; from a normative point 
of view, it is important to understand how an 
‘optimal tax’ on housing can be designed. 
 
The absence of almost any study on the issue of 
housing taxation is magnified in the case of 
countries where taxes have been used – together 
with other policies - to favour homeownership. 
Italy is an important case study in this respect for 
many reasons. Like in other Mediterranean 
countries (e.g., Spain), the Italian Tax Code 
basically exempts the figurative income from 
homeownership, while contemporaneously 
allowing for tax credits in the case of mortgage 
interests, creating a clear favour for owner-
occupiers (e.g., Baldini, 2010). These fiscal 
advantages for home-owners reasonably 
increased given the international trends in market 
prices, which - differently from tax bases - soared 
in recent years. Moreover, differently from other 
countries, Italy shares with the Mediterranean 
countries also a high number of owner-occupiers 
coupled with a system of public pensions 
particularly generous, generating a substantial 
redistribution in favour of the elderly (e.g., Ferrera 
and Castles, 1996). In particular, the share of 
owner-occupied housing has increased strongly 
since 1977, reaching 72% of Italian households in 
the late 2000s, a figure close to that of Portugal 
(73%), but lower than Spain (83%); the share of 
owner-occupiers is instead lower in Continental 
European countries, like France and Germany, 
where these percentages amount to 58 and 46, 
respectively (e.g., Baldini, 2010). All these 
redistributive issues are coupled with increasing 
difficulties for those who do not own their house 
to afford housing expenses. On the one hand, 
public expenditures for housing represent only a 
mere 0.1 percent of welfare expenditures in Italy, 
compared with an average 3.5 percent in the EU 
countries (e.g., D’Alessio and Gambacorta, 2007; 
Baldini, 2010). On the other hand, given the 
increase in market values and the liberalization of 
rental markets occurred during the 1990s (with 
the removal of upper limits), also rents increased 
noticeably. Hence, the non-owners found it 
increasingly difficult to buy a house or pay a rent, 
a situation that could be improved also by 
reforming housing taxation. 
 
However, no government has tried to propose a 
general reform of housing taxation to ameliorate 
the current situation, since the share of owners is 
high and the issue is politically sensitive. Not 
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implemented in 2008, increased even further 
advantages for owners, reasonably creating 
adverse redistributive effects in order to gain 
short-term political benefits. Unfortunately, the 
Italian government has not developed so far a 
model to assess the distribution of housing taxes, 
so that fiscal policy simulations are difficult to 
estimate. 
 
The aim of this paper is to fill the gap, by 
developing the first (static) microsimulation model 
explicitly devoted to the analysis of housing 
taxation in Italy. In particular, we are interested in 
two basic issues: first, we want to characterize the 
current distribution of taxes on housing, 
reconciling the (scant) aggregate figures on 
housing with those originating from micro data; 
second, we want to apply the microsimulation 
model to study the redistributive impact of fiscal 
reforms, and take the 2008 reform of the Property 
Tax as a case study. We use as input data those 
provided by the Bank of Italy from its Survey on 
Households Income and Wealth, and discuss the 
specific problems arising in the evaluation of the 
cadastral income and the Property Tax base. The 
model replicates fairly well the distribution of 
taxpayers provided by the Ministry of Finance, 
which makes it a reliable tool to evaluate tax 
reforms on housing in Italy. Our simulations on 
the 2006 data suggest that both Property Tax and 
Waste Management Tax show a moderate 
regressive impact with respect to household gross 
income, whilst the Personal Income Tax on 
dwellings other than the main residence is 
progressive. Moreover, studying the Property Tax 
reform in 2008, our simulations show that all 
households owning the main residence gain from 
the 2008 reform, but tax cuts are mostly 
concentrated on the top three deciles of household 
gross income, so that the richest benefited most. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 provides a brief institutional 
description of housing taxation in Italy. Section 3 
describes the microsimulation model, discussing 
the distribution of cadastral incomes and the 
simulations of main taxes on houses for Italian 
households. Section 4 offers a first application of 
the model, to study the distributive impact of the 
2008 reform of the Property Tax. Section 5 briefly 
ends the paper. 
2.  HOUSING TAXATION IN ITALY: 
INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
Like in other developed countries, there are a 
number of different taxes on houses and buildings 
in the Italian tax legislation. Total tax revenues 
from housing amount to about 40 billion of euro in 
the late 2000s, i.e. 2.7 percent of GDP and 5.9 
percent of total tax revenues (Ministry of Finance, 
2008). We can classify ‘housing taxes’ in two 
broad groups: a first group is identified by taxes 
on house ownership and dwelling utilization (54% 
of revenues); a second group considers taxes due 
when buying or selling, as well as restructuring a 
dwelling or any other kind of building (46% of 
revenues). Since our aim here is to develop a 
static microsimulation model for the analysis of 
housing taxation, we focus on the first group of 
taxes only, and limit our analysis to households, 
leaving aside buildings owned by (public and 
private) firms. The main taxes of the first group 
are: the Personal Income Tax (hereafter House-
PIT), within which the (figurative) income from 
houses is taxed (about 7 billion euro); the 
Property Tax (hereafter ICI, from Imposta 
Comunale sugli Immobili, Municipal Tax on 
Buildings, about 5.2 billion euro that dropped to 
2.4 billion after the 2008 ICI reform); and the 
Urban Waste Management Tax (hereafter TARSU, 
from  Tassa per lo Smaltimento dei Rifiuti Solidi 
Urbani, about 3 billion euro). In what follows we 
briefly describe the institutional details of House-
PIT, ICI and TARSU. 
 
House-PIT.  Incomes from dwellings are 
determined in different ways according to the kind 
of use, and imputed to each owner or life-tenant
1 
according to her percentage of ownership. Current 
rules in the Tax Code identify income for the 
taxpayer dwelling as the ‘cadastral income’, i.e. a 
hypothetical rent based on the property 
description and valuation listed in the local Land 
Register (the so-called Catasto Fabbricati), which 
was last revised in 1939 and is clearly far from 
current market values. Income from unoccupied 
or holiday homes is equal to cadastral income 
augmented by one third. Finally, income from 
rented dwellings is equal to 85 percent of the 
actual rent. As for the owners, from 2001 onwards 
the income from the main residence is exempted 
from the PIT tax base; on the contrary, income 
from other dwellings is included in the taxable 
income. Mortgage interests and maintenance 
expenditures allow the owner a tax credit. As for 
the renters, up to 2008 no tax credits were 
allowed for the main residence. At present, a tax 
credit related to personal income of the renter (up 
to about 30,000 euro) is allowed; it is higher for 
renters younger than 30 years old. 
 
ICI.  Since 1993 a Property Tax (ICI) on each 
dwelling has been introduced. The tax unit is the 
individual according to her percentage of 
ownership. Tax revenues accrue directly to each 
Municipality where the buildings are located. In 
principle, the ICI tax base should be the market 
value of the dwelling; in practice, this is not the 
case since it is evaluated by simply multiplying the 
cadastral income by 100
2. Each Municipality can 
choose the tax rate in a range between a 
minimum of 0.4 percent and a maximum of 0.7 
(Pellegrino, 2007, for further details). Up to 2007, 
a tax credit on the main residence was available. 
                                                
1   The life-tenant retains the right (which is 
legally labelled ‘usufruct’) to freely use the 
dwelling for all her life. The owner then has 
just the ‘bare property’ of the building, but no 
rights to use it. 
2   The value of the dwelling is then equal to the 
perpetual annuity of the cadastral income with 
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Starting from 2008, no ICI is due on the main 
residence  
TARSU. Waste management services are financed 
by a tax directly accruing to municipalities that 
manage the service. The taxpayers are the 
households living in the dwellings (regardless of 
their tenure status), and those owning unoccupied 
or holiday homes. Contrary to what one could 
expect, the tax debt is not related to the amount 
of waste produced by each household, but to the 
size of the house. In particular, tax debt is 
determined by multiplying a tariff per square 
meter by the total surface of the dwelling. Some 
tax reductions are allowed for people living alone, 
unoccupied dwellings, and poor households. 
3.  THE MICROSIMULATION MODEL 
The microsimulation model used in this paper 
estimates the most important taxes and 
contributions characterizing the Italian fiscal 
system, concentrating in particular on the main 
taxes on housing. This marks a striking difference 
with respect to other comparable tax-benefit 
models, like EUROMOD, used to study for instance 
the impact of the mortgage interest tax relief 
within the PIT, but with no clear focus on taxes on 
houses and buildings (e.g., Matsaganis and 
Flevotomou, 2007). The model considers as input 
data those provided by the Bank of Italy (2008) in 
its Survey on Households Income and Wealth 
(hereafter SHIW-BI). The Survey contains 
information on household income and wealth in 
the year 2006, covering 7,768 households, and 
19,848 individuals. The sample is representative 
for the Italian population
3, composed by about 
23,5 million households and 60 million individuals. 
Relevant information for the analysis of housing 
taxation in the SHIW-BI include: the overall net 
income, the market value of real estates, the size 
(in square meters) of the dwellings, the dwelling 
maintenance expenditures, the interests paid on 
mortgage, and the initial mortgage debt. Notice 
that the SHIW-BI net income is defined on a 
personal basis, while mortgage interests and real 
estates information are available only at the 
household level. However, by exploiting 
information on the ownership shares, it is possible 
to evaluate the value of real estates also at the 
individual level. We then start by simulating 
income and taxes at the individual level, and then 
aggregate results at the household level. 
 
In 2006 the National Land Agency (2008) 
estimated the total number of residence dwellings 
to be 30.8 million: 26.2 million (85 percent) are 
owned by households, while the remaining 4.6 
million (15 percent) are owned by public and 
private firms. This is the only available information 
at the aggregate level on real estates in Italy, 
since the National Land Agency statistics refer 
only to dwelling characteristics and not also to 
dwelling owners. In what follows we clearly limit 
our analysis to the 26.2 million of dwellings owned 
                                                




There are a number of problems to be solved in 
order to appropriately simulate housing taxation 
starting from SHIW-BI. First, we need to calibrate 
the model, attributing second homes to 
households in order to make SHIW-BI data 
compatible with aggregate statistics provided by 
the Ministry of Finance and the Land Register. 
Second, we need to evaluate cadastral values for 
given current market values. Third, we need to 
reconstruct gross incomes starting from net 
incomes provided in the survey. Fourth, we need 
to aggregate incomes at the household level, and 
define an equivalent income for the redistributive 
analysis. Below, we will discuss solutions for each 
of these problems. 
 
Table 1 shows the composition of households by 
tenure status focusing on main residences 
according to the SHIW-BI. Total households are 
about 23.5 million: 16.1 million (68.7 percent) are 
the owner-occupiers of their main residence
4; 0.7 
million (3.1 percent) are life-tenants; 5 million 
(21.3 percent) rent or occupy it under 
“redemption agreement” (the so-called “a 
riscatto”), while 1.6 million (7.0 percent) are rent-
free tenants (and in 92 percent of the cases, the 
dwelling is owned by relatives or friends)
5. 
 
Even if the number and the composition of main 
residences are reliable, the SHIW-BI dataset 
underestimates the total number of dwellings 
other than the main residence. In particular, 
about 3.5 million households (hence 3.5 million 
dwellings) declare to rent the main residence from 
other households, while the dwellings the 
interviewees declare to rent to other households 
are about 0.8 million; the gap is 2.7 million 
dwellings. Similarly, about 1.5 million households 
(1.5 million dwellings) declare to be rent-free 
tenants, while the dwellings the interviewees 
declare to rent free of charge to other households 
are about 0.5 million; the gap is 1 million 
dwellings. Finally, in the SHIW-BI dataset there 
are only 2.2 million unoccupied dwellings or 
holiday homes, while they are expected to be 
twice as many, as this number is computed by 
subtracting from the total number of dwellings all 
the other categories previously analyzed. 
 
 
                                                
4   Almost all the owner-occupiers (88.7 percent) 
are not burdened with a mortgage, while only a 
small percentage (11.3 percent) have a 
mortgage. 
5   As for tenants, almost 70 percent rent the 
house from other households; 25.7 percent of 
tenants rent from public bodies, like the 
Istituto Autonomo Case Popolari (a locally 
funded Institute providing housing to the 
poor), but also – to a minor extent - Regions, 
Provinces, Municipalities; and 4 percent from 
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Table 1  Households main residences composition by tenure status 
Tenure Status  Composition (%) 
Owner occupiers (with or without mortgage)  68.7 
Life-tenants  3.1 
Tenants or occupiers under redemption agreement  21.3 
Rent-free tenants  7.0 
Total  100.0 
Note: The total number of households is 23,481,999. 




There are two possible explanations for the 
underestimation of the number of dwellings in 
SHIW-BI: first, the interviewees do not declare 
the exact number of unoccupied dwellings or 
holiday homes and rented dwellings, as well as 
dwellings rented free of charge (Coromaldi and 
Guerrera, 2009); second, it is not guaranteed that 
the original SHIW-BI sample contains a 
representative sub-sample of Italian households 
owning dwellings other than the main residence. 
Since SHIW-BI information on the number and on 
the characteristics of the main residences is 
reliable, we use this information in order to 
reconcile the number of dwellings other than the 
main residence owned by households with 
aggregate statistics published by the National 
Land Agency. This calibration is important to 
obtain a reliable estimation of revenues from 
housing taxes, and to correctly evaluate the 
distribution of housing taxation among 
households. In order to solve the problem, we 
then consider the whole SHIW-BI sub-sample of 
households owning at least the main residence 
and randomly attribute the missing dwellings. 
Excluding owner occupied dwellings (16.1 million), 
our estimates suggest that the total number of 
other dwellings owned by households is about 10 
million. Table 2 reports the estimated composition 
by type of utilization: 0.7 million (6.8 percent) are 
used by life-tenants, 3.5 million (35 percent) are 
rented to other families, 1.5 million (14.9 percent) 
are given up free of charge, while the unoccupied 
dwelling and holiday homes are 4.3 million (43.3 
percent). 
Table 2  Composition of second homes owned by households by type of utilization 
Type of utilization  Composition (%) 
Life-tenants households  6.8 
Free-rented to households  14.9 
Rented to households  35.0 
Unoccupied dwellings or holiday homes  43.3 
Total  100.0 
Note: The total number of dwellings is 10,052,261. 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
 
 
Once the number and the composition of dwellings 
owned by households have been properly 
estimated, another problem needs to be solved in 
order to correctly analyze housing taxation 
through our microsimulation model. This is the 
estimation of the cadastral value and the cadastral 
income of each dwelling. This is important since it 
represents the ICI and House-PIT tax base, 
respectively, to be imputed to each taxpayer. The 
National Land Agency estimates the number and 
the composition, as well as the overall cadastral 
value of dwellings (i.e., the overall ICI tax base). 
The SHIW-BI dataset contains information on the 
current market value of each dwelling owned by 
households. We compare these two aggregate 
values in order to obtain the average 
underestimation of overall cadastral values with 
respect to overall market values. Then, we impute 
the same percentage of underestimation (which is 
approximately equal to 77 percent) to the current 
value of each dwelling declared by each 
interviewee. By dividing the result by 100, and 
using the percentage of ownership of each person 
within the household, we obtain the cadastral 
income included in each taxpayer’s definition of 
PIT gross income. No specific problems arise in 
the simulation of TARSU, since it is linked to the 
size of the dwelling. 
 
Once incomes from housing have been identified, 
as the SHIW-BI provides information on each 
individual  net income, we need to estimate the 
gross income for each taxpayer. Since the SHIW-
BI definition of each individual net income is 
different from the Tax Code definition, the 
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incomes included in the PIT taxable income 
definition, incomes exempt from any taxes, and 
incomes taxed under a separate regime. The PIT 
gross income distribution is then evaluated 
starting from the net income distribution. The 
transition from the post- to the pre-tax personal 
income of each individual has been computed by 
applying the algorithm proposed by Immervoll and 
O’Donoghue (2001). Using original sample 
weights, the grossing-up procedure simply 
proportions the sum of individuals’ sample weights 
to the dimension of the population as estimated 
by the National Statistical Office (ISTAT). Then the 
grossed-up number of PIT taxpayers has been 
obtained by considering individuals with a positive 
gross income within the microsimulation model. 
 
Finally, we aggregate net and gross incomes at 
the household level. The gross income is equal to 
the sum of PIT gross income, family benefits (the 
so-called Assegni al Nucleo Familiare, a small cash 
transfer varying with the number of children and 
income), incomes exempt from taxation, gross 
incomes from financial assets, gross incomes 
taxed under a separate regime. The net income is 
equal to the gross income net of all taxes 
considered in the model: PIT, taxes on financial 
assets, taxes due on income taxed under a 
separate regime, ICI, TARSU, and IRAP (the 
regional tax on the value added). We subtract the 
mortgage interests from the result. In the 
following analysis, we consider all households in 
the dataset; in particular, we do not drop 
households with zero household income in order 
to obtain results on a homogeneous sample. In 
order to obtain the equivalent i n c o m e  w e  a d o p t  
the Cutler Scale (CS), defined as: 
()
β α C A N N CS + =  
where  1 0 ≤ ≤ A N  and  1 0 ≤ ≤ C N  are, 
respectively, the number of adults and children
6 
within each household, whilst  1 0 ≤ ≤α  is the 
parameter assigning a different weight to children 
with respect to adults, and  1 0 ≤ ≤ β  indicates 
the ‘scale economies’ attached to the equivalence 
scale
7. 
4.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section we discuss the results of our 
simulation exercise of the main taxes on housing. 
We begin by comparing statistics from our model 
                                                
6   We consider here children all individuals within 
the household aged 17 or less. 
7    Different equivalence scales have been 
proposed. The Cutler and Kats scale is the 
most general, since most of the other 
equivalence scales can be obtained by varying 
its parameters. It can be also useful in 
sensitivity analysis. More precisely, according 
to van de Ven and Creedy (2005) 
methodology, a close approximation of the 
government implicit scale can be obtained by 
choosing scale parameters that minimise the 
re-ranking. 
with official statistics, and then describe the main 
findings from the simulation. 
 
In order to assess the “goodness – of-fit” of the 
model, we compare our results with the Ministry 
of Finance official statistics. Unfortunately, 
statistics on House-PIT are available only at the 
individual level, while no official statistics on ICI 
and TARSU distribution have been ever published. 
As a consequence, we first compare the PIT 
module results of the microsimulation by 
considering the individual as the reference tax 
unit; we then discuss results at the household 
level. 
 
Table 3 presents the differences between the 
simulation results and the official statistics from 
the Ministry of Finance, in terms of numbers of 
taxpayers and average gross income. As can be 
concluded from the table, differences are 
proportionally very small. 
Notice that only statistics on employees and 
pensioners (who represent 87.1 per cent of the 
overall taxpayers), as well as self-employed 
taxpayers are fully comparable, since the Ministry 
of Finance official statistics do not specifically 
focus on taxpayers having only other kind of 
incomes (e.g., only income from dwellings). 
The estimated number of employees and 
pensioners within the microsimulation model is, 
respectively, 0.5 and 0.3 percent lower than the 
official figure, while the number of self-employed 
taxpayers is 4.4 percent higher. On the contrary, 
the estimated number of ‘other’ (non working) 
taxpayers appears to be substantially different 
from official statistics (81.6 percent higher). The 
explanation of this huge difference is quite simple: 
by considering all observations within the SHIW 
dataset, the microsimulation model is able to 
identify all taxpayers with a positive gross income, 
while official statistics cannot consider taxpayers 
for whom the tax return form presentation is not 
compulsory according to Italian rules; this 
happens for instance when taxpayer’s gross 
income is represented by the main residence 
cadastral income only. 
 
Table 4 presents the PIT gross income distribution 
by income classes. Again, official statistics are 
very close to our estimates. Some differences can 
be observed only for the number of taxpayers 
belonging to the classes 0-3, 15-20 and 29-40 
thousands euro. 
Given the good approximation of the model, we 
now discuss simulation results on ‘housing taxes’ 
more in detail. We start from the estimates of 
cadastral incomes. About 16.8 million of 
households own the dwelling where they live. 
According to the SHIW-BI dataset, about 50 
percent of main residences are owned only by one 
individual, while the other 50 percent have two or 
more owners. As a consequence, PIT taxpayers 
with a positive main residence cadastral income 
are about 24.3 million (40.5 percent of the 
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Table 3  Composition of PIT taxpayers and mean gross income by work status 



















Employee 19,790,570  19,898,390  99.5  21,121  21,229  99.5 









(2) 181.6  2,063    -  - 
Total 41,493,969  40,458,702 102.6  17,858  18,324  97.5 
Note:   (1) The statistic considers taxpayers with VAT code. 
  (2) The number of these taxpayers has been evaluated as difference. 
  (3) The mean value has been obtained considering taxpayers with positive and negative incomes. 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI and Ministry of Finance 2008.      
Table 4  Gross income distribution by income classes (all taxpayers) 











0-1.000 6.8 344 5.0  453 
1.000-3.000 3.7  2,000  5.1  1,934 
3.000-5.000 3.7  4,065  4.1  3,998 
5.000-7.500 11.7  6,243  12.2  6,093 
7.500-10.000 6.9  9,037  8.3  12,365 
10.000-15.000  17.9 12,543 16.6  12,586 
15.000-20.000  20.6 17,363 16.9  17,409 
20.000-25.000  11.2 22,466 11.7  22,316 
25.000-29.000  5.8 27,047 6.2  26,862 
29.000-40.000  5.8 34,201 7.4  33,355 
40.000-50.000  2.1 44,076 2.3  44,373 
50.000-70.000  2.2 58,374 2.0  58,554 
70.000-100.000  1.1 82,539 1.2  82,242 
100.000-150.000  0.4 123,343 0.5  119,149 
oltre  150.000  0.3 298,685 0.3  284,662 
Total  100.0 17,858 100.0  18,324 
Note:   The total number of taxpayers is 41,493,969.    
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI and Ministry of Finance 2008.   
 
 
Considering PIT taxpayers, Table 5 shows that the 
average cadastral income is 363 euro, and it is 
slightly increasing with respect to the PIT gross 
income: it ranges from 219 euro for taxpayers 
with PIT gross income less than 1 thousand euro, 
and about one thousand euro for taxpayers with 
PIT gross income higher than 150 thousand euro. 
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Table 5 D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  m a i n  r e s i d e n c e  








0-1.000 9.7 219 
1.000-3.000 3.9  299 
3.000-5.000 3.0  252 
5.000-7.500 10.2  266 
7.500-10.000 6.3  345 
10.000-15.000 16.0  322 
15.000-20.000 19.0  354 
20.000-25.000 11.6  403 
25.000-29.000 6.4  432 
29.000-40.000 6.6  463 
40.000-50.000 2.3  590 
50.000-70.000 2.8  646 
70.000-100.000 1.5  744 
100.000-150.000 0.4  920 
Above 150.000  0.4  1,010 
Total 100.0  363 
Note:  The total number of taxpayers is 
24,319,766. 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
 
Even if the distribution of the main residence 
cadastral income is quite close to official statistics 
provided by the Ministry of Finance, both the 
estimated number of taxpayers with a positive 
main residence cadastral income and its average 
value are very different (15.7 million and 470 
euro, respectively). These differences depend on 
the data available to the Ministry of Finance, 
which exclude a large share of taxpayers with only 
dependent labour incomes besides their own 
residence. Whenever a taxpayer possesses only 
dependent employment incomes and the main 
residence cadastral income, presentation of the 
tax return form is not compulsory (being the main 
residence cadastral income fully deductible from 
the PIT gross income), so that only information on 
wage incomes are sent to the Ministry of Finance 
by her employer. In these cases, no information 
are available on the main residence cadastral 
income. Moreover, as discussed above, official 
statistics cannot consider taxpayers for whom the 
tax return form presentation is not compulsory, 
whilst the microsimulation model has detailed 
information to estimate all income earned by each 
interviewee. As a consequence, our estimates are 
to be considered more reliable. 
 
Table 6 reports the distribution of all incomes from 
dwellings. This statistic considers main residence 
cadastral incomes plus incomes from unoccupied 
or holiday homes, as well as incomes from rented 
dwellings. PIT taxpayers with a positive income 
from dwellings are about 26.4 million. The mean 
value is equal to 1,455 euro, and – differently 
from statistics in Table 5 - it increases sharply 
with respect to the PIT gross income: it ranges 
from 276 euro for taxpayers with PIT gross 
income less than 1 thousand euro, and about ten 
thousand euro for taxpayers with PIT gross 
income above 150 thousand euro. This steep 
gradient can be due to the generosity of the 
Italian tax system towards housing, which induced 
households to invest much of their wealth in 
housing than in alternative financial assets. 
Table 6 Distribution of overall income from 







0-1.000 9.8  276 
1.000-3.000 4.1  586 
3.000-5.000 2.9  708 
5.000-7.500 10.0  541 
7.500-10.000 6.2  784 
10.000-15.000 15.6  724 
15.000-20.000 18.5  784 
20.000-25.000 11.7  1,305 
25.000-29.000 6.5  1,702 
29.000-40.000 6.8  2,645 
40.000-50.000 2.5  3,745 
50.000-70.000 2.9  6,031 
70.000-100.000 1.5  10,816 
100.000-150.000  0.5 21,733 
Above 150.000  0.4  10,315 
Total 100.0  1,455 
Note:   The total number of taxpayers is 
26,446,945. 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
 
Turning to households, Table 7 shows the 
distribution of households by deciles of equivalent 
gross income. Several insights emerge from the 
Table. First, the higher the decile, the higher the 
percentage of owner-occupier within each decile. 
However, since 71.7 per cent of households own 
their main residence, the gap between the first 
and the last decile is relatively small (59.1 percent 
to 76.1 for household without mortgage and 5.3 
percent to 10.1 for households with mortgage). 
Second, the percentage of tenants within each 
decile is decreasing: it is 26.7 percent in the first 
decile and 10 percent in the top one. The same 
picture is observed for rent-free tenants.PELLEGRINO - PIACENZA - TURATI     Developing a static microsimulation model for the analysis of housing taxation  
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1   59.1   5.3   26.7   8.9   100.0  
2   59.6   4.1   27.2   9.1   100.0  
3   59.3   7.1   24.0   9.7   100.0  
4   62.1   7.1   22.2   8.6   100.0  
5   60.3   7.6   25.4   6.7   100.0  
6   65.9   9.1   19.4   5.6   100.0  
7   64.1   9.1   20.8   6.0   100.0  
8   63.2   11.9   19.7   5.2   100.0  
9   67.6   10.1   16.5   5.8   100.0  
10   76.1   10.1   10.0   3.8   100.0  
Total  63.6   8.1   21.3   7.0   100.0  
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
 
 
At the household level, the overall average value 
of the main residence cadastral income is 524 
euro. It increases with respect to income deciles, 
but not as much as could be expected: it is 366 
euro in the first decile and only 904 euro (about 
2.5 times) in the last one (Table 8). 
Table 8    Percentage of households with positive 
main residence cadastral income and its 













1   64.4   366.4   5.0  
2   63.7   362.0   2.9  
3   66.4   367.3   2.3  
4   69.2   406.4   2.3  
5   67.9   494.3   2.5  
6   74.9   483.8   2.0  
7   73.2   508.6   1.8  
8   75.1   570.4   1.8  
9   77.7   668.0   1.7  
10   86.2   903.9   1.3  
Total  71.7   524.0   1.9  
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
 
Moreover, the ratio between the main residence 
cadastral income and the household income is 
decreasing with income: it is 5 per cent in the first 
decile and only 1.9 percent in the last. Since the 
ICI tax base is based on cadastral income, the ICI 
tax is then expected to be regressive.  
Focusing on dwellings other than the main 
residence, Table 9 reports the average incomes 
from housing by decile of household equivalent 
gross income. Recall that income from other 
dwellings owned by households is the cadastral 
income for unoccupied dwellings or holiday 
houses, as well as rented dwellings for which 
actual rent has not been included in the tax base; 
it is the actual rent for rented and declared 
dwellings. About one fourth of the households 
have at least one dwelling besides the main 
residence: the percentage is only 13.3 in the first 
decile and 53.1 in the last one. The richer the 
household, the higher the income from dwelling 
other than the main residence: it is only 964 euro 
for poorest households and about 14 thousands 
euro for the richest ones. 
 
Once the distribution of cadastral incomes has 
been evaluated, we are able to turn to the 
simulation of the distribution of House-PIT, ICI 
and TARSU taxes - which represent all taxes on 
house ownership and dwelling utilization - by 
decile of household equivalent gross income. As 
ICI is a Municipal tax, the simulation of the ICI tax 
liability paid by each taxpayer considers the 
overall average value of the tax rate and the 
overall average value of the tax credit computed 
at the regional level. Similarly, the TARSU tax has 
been estimated considering the mean tariff per 
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Table 9 Percentage of households with positive 
other housing income and its mean value 












1   13.3   964.2   11.6  
2   14.7   1,709.6   12.9  
3   18.0   1,847.2   11.3  
4   19.6   1,652.2   8.6  
5   21.6   2,402.1   11.7  
6   27.7   2,124.4   8.3  
7   21.9   2,526.6   8.5  
8   31.1   2,758.1   8.1  
9   40.9   4,922.8   12.0  
10   53.1   13,733.8   20.3  
Total  26.0   4,862.8   14.1  
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
 
Figure 1 reports the incidence on gross income of 
ICI and TARSU on main residences by deciles of 
gross income; only households with positive ICI 
and TARSU are considered. Both taxes show a 
similar and moderately regressive impact: both 
ICI and TARSU are 1.2 percent for the first decile; 
ICI is 0.4 percent for the top one, while TARSU is 
0.3 percent. This is not surprising: a proportional 
property tax could be progressive with respect to 
income whenever housing wealth is increasing 
with respect to income. But ICI do not consider 
real market values of dwellings, and the cadastral 
values are highly underestimated. A similar 
situation is experienced by the TARSU: tax debt is 
determined by multiplying a tariff per square 
meter by the total square meters of the dwelling. 
As long as income increases, the dimension of the 
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Figure 2 reports the incidence of House-PIT, ICI 
and TARSU on dwellings other than the main 
residence. Only households with at least one 
dwelling other than the main residence are 
considered. The incidence of House-PIT is 
increasing: it is about 0.5 percent for household 
belonging to the bottom decile and 6 percent for 
households belonging to the top one. For what it 
concerns ICI and TARSU, a similar picture with 
respect to that observed on main residences 
emerges: ICI paid on other dwellings is 2.1 
percent for the bottom decile and 0.8 percent for 
the top one; the corresponding values for TARSU 
are 1.3 and 0.3, respectively. 
To better characterize the tax progressivity of the 
system and the role of housing taxation, we 
consider the Kakwani index, which is defined as 
the difference between the concentration 
coefficient for taxes and the Gini coefficient for the 
gross income (Lambert, 2001). As for taxes, we 
consider the overall tax system and then we focus 
on each specific tax on housing considered in the 
paper. Table 10 reports Kakwani indices for the 
overall tax-benefit system, the House-PIT, ICI and 
TARSU. Differently from Figure 1 and 2, here we 
consider all households. The overall Kakwani index 
is 0.053. Both ICI and TARSU do not influence tax 
progressivity, while the House-PIT (which refers to 
the taxation of second homes, being the main 
residences exempt) explains about 10% of the 
overall tax progressivity. This is not surprising 
given the high percentage of households with their 
wealth invested in real estates. Given this 
situation, the Italian policy maker should consider 
housing taxation and the reform of figurative rents 
as an important issue for enhancing tax 
progressivity of the system as a whole. However, 
this is not what happened in Italy during the last 
years, as we show in the next section taking as an 
example the 2008 Property Tax reform. PELLEGRINO - PIACENZA - TURATI     Developing a static microsimulation model for the analysis of housing taxation  
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Table 10  Kakwani index 







Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
5.  AN APPLICATION: THE DISTRIBUTIVE 
IMPACT OF THE 2008 HOUSING 
TAXATION REFORM 
Besides studying the distribution of housing taxes 
in the current system, the microsimulation model 
developed in the paper is important to simulate 
the impact of a fiscal policy reform. Here we take 
as an example the 2008 reform of the Property 
Tax, that basically exempted the main residence. 
In principle, given the mild regressivity and the 
generosity of the current system, one would have 
expected to observe a reform aimed at reconciling 
cadastral incomes with current market values. 
Despite this, no reforms to introduce a sort of 
mark-to-market mechanisms for the update of 
cadastral income have been proposed in the last 
decades. On the contrary, given the high number 
of owner-occupiers, in order to gain political 
benefits, from 2008 ownership of the main 
residence is even exempted from taxation not only 
with respect to income taxation, but also with 
respect to the Property Tax. There are two main 
concerns about this reform: on the one hand, ICI 
is the most important local tax, so that revenues 
accruing to Municipalities decreased from about 12 
billion euro in 2006 to about 9 billion euro in 2008 
(from 5.2 billion euro to 2.4 when considering only 
dwelling own by households), with the difference 
being covered by state transfers that limit the 
local government responsibility; on the other 
hand, as long as the ownership of the main 
residence increases the taxpayer ability to pay, 
the 2008 tax cuts go in the direction of lowering 
the progressive impact of the tax system as a 
whole. 
 
Table 11 shows the percentage of households with 
positive Property Tax both before and after the 
2008 reform. In 2006, 16 percent of households 
with a positive ICI tax base (11.6 percent of all 
households) had to pay no ICI, since their tax 
credits were bigger than the gross ICI. Notice that 
even if tax credits were not linked to household 
income but to dwelling utilization, most of 
households actually exempted from the Property 
Tax were belonging to the left tail of income 
distribution. 
Before the reform about two third of households 
had a positive ICI. More precisely, about 60% of 
households had to pay the ICI on the main 
residence, whilst 30.6% paid ICI on other 
dwellings. As expected, the percentage of 
households is moderately increasing with gross 
income when main residences are considered 
(values range from 43 to 83.9%); they increase 
sharply when households owning second homes 
are considered (values range from 18.8 to 
55.5%). 
 
After the 2008 reform, no owner occupier has to 
pay ICI on the main residence; the actual 
distribution of the tax is then the one observed on 
dwellings other than the main residence. Table 11 
also shows the tax cuts distribution caused by the 
reform, which is clearly increasing with income 
deciles, and mostly concentrated in the top three 
deciles of the distribution: the top decile benefits 
one fourth of the overall tax cuts, while the share 
is 15 percent on the ninth and 11.7 on the eighth; 
on the other hand, the first decile gains only 4.7 
percent, the second 4.8 percent and the third 5.3. 
The average reduction of tax debt is low: on 
average, it is about 200 euro, ranging from 142 
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To conclude, since the 1980s Italian taxpayers 
have shown a high sensibility with regard to 
housing taxation. This explains why both right and 
left parties have proposed tax cuts on the main 
residences, and still favor housing with respect to 
investment in alternative assets. Not surprisingly, 
political benefits from this reform have been 
consistent, even though taxpayers’ economic 
benefits have been very low in absolute value. A 
tax cut for everyone has no losers, but the 
distribution of benefits resulted in a more unequal 
distribution.
Table 11  Tax cuts distribution of the 2008 housing taxation reform 
   Households with positive ICI (%)    













the tax cuts 
between 2006 
and 2008 
1 43.0  18.8  49.4  0.0  18.8  18.8  4.7 
2 44.2  22.3  53.8  0.0  22.3  22.3  4.8 
3 48.6  24.7  57.0  0.0  24.7  24.7  5.3 
4 52.1  24.7  59.0  0.0  24.7  24.7  6.3 
5 57.9  25.6  63.2  0.0  25.6  25.6  8.6 
6 64.0  32.1  72.1  0.0  32.1  32.1  8.9 
7 65.6  26.1  70.9  0.0  26.1  26.1  9.5 
8 69.3  33.9  73.8  0.0  33.9  33.9  11.7 
9 74.2  44.0  80.5  0.0  44.0  44.0  15.0 
10 83.9  55.5  89.6  0.0  55.5  55.5  25.0 
Total 59.9  30.6 66.6  0.0  30.6  30.6  100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI.
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we develop a first (static) 
microsimulation model to study the distributive 
impact of housing taxation and fiscal policy 
reforms on Italian households. Our simulations 
suggest that both Property Tax and Waste 
Management Tax show a moderate regressive 
impact with respect to household gross income, 
whilst the Personal Income Tax on dwellings other 
than the main residence is progressive. In order to 
provide an application of our model, we then 
study the Property Tax reform in 2008, which 
basically exempted the main residence. All 
households owning the main residence gain from 
the 2008 reform, but tax cuts are mostly 
concentrated on the last three deciles of 
household equivalent gross income, so that the 
richest benefited most. 
 
The availability of a microsimulation model 
specifically devoted to study housing taxation can 
of course help in a number of directions. One first 
example is its use for the simulation of alternative 
policy reforms. For instance, an important 
question to be asked is relative to the impact of a 
policy aimed at reconciling cadastral values with 
market values. The enlargement of the tax base 
will allow the government to reduce tax wedges 
on capital and, more importantly, labour incomes. 
What are the expected effects on efficiency and 
those on equity is a question that deserves an 
answer, especially for a country – like Italy – 
where the reduction of the cost of labour is a 
highly debated issue. A second example is related 
to political economy issues: the microsimulation 
model will allow us to define net gainers and net 
losers when implementing a policy reform, hence 
explaining whether or not a given policy has any 
chances to be really implemented in terms of 
political support. 
 
Needless to say, the model can be further 
improved, in particular incorporating behavioural 
responses. As it is well known, a static model does 
not incorporate by definition individuals’ reactions 
to a change in tax policy parameters. For instance, 
we cannot answer to questions such as what 
happens to current market prices in the housing 
market when we include in the PIT tax base 
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